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prepared with the help of a "lallhouae lawyer", dated December 
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Supreme Court by the Warden of the Utah State Prison. 
This occurred because my appeal lawyer, Jay Edmonds, 
intercepted this document and refused to turn it over to my 
wife, Sally. Instead, he chose to cripple my Supreme Court 
appeal by sending it on December 8th to the warden of a prison 
dedicated to interfering with prisoners' access to the courts. 
It does so by instructing their contract law firm to 
file no action for prisoners and by not letting us have 
typewriters or access to copy machines. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 
R'M'F OF "TAH, : PETITION FOR 
Plaintiff-Respondent : WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
-vs- : Cnu« #89027:1 CA 
NEWTON COLLIER ESTES, : Category No 2 
Defendant-Appellant• : 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Should the Supreme Court now decide if gull t y - plea 
t • 2 o i i r t t h *\ • i I * e ii t a t e w J 1 1 n o t c a 11 
witnesses nor will they produce any evidence" cause a plea 
to become unknowing and thus involuntary when the prosecutor 
subsequently presents a seven (7) page J 1st with description of 
search warrant evidence and proposed witness hearsay testimony 
to the judge? ..u chambers, without the knowledge 
the defendant. 
ni Did the Court of Appeals present a conflict 
w i t h d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court «i J St n1 H " *tw / IR I I 
approved the evidence and testimony of Item i above being 
received by I,he District Court in chambers and used to decide 
H H J I i lv* i . j ree i in I j ii in I II 1 1111 -e 11 1 ln " ill l i m i t - \n «i, II li 1 i i i - i t e r l a l ah a 3 Ill b e 
presented in open com I in my presence? 
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b) Ta Jt an unacceptable departure from di ie 
process pi" 1 nc 1 p 1 ea f or !; lie Appeals Court to rule that t !" i,e words 
of the Minute Entry aaying I "was present" when t lie evidence of 
Statement 1 was presented in chambers constitute proof f hat I 
was there an.d ha nil thua voJ untari 1 y wa 1 ved my ri ght a under 
77- 18-1(4)? 
Instead II I d I I m " " IIIUPIH •
 l( r e 0,4:1 , n i a . l t : ,1 1 11 y I 
ascertain the truth o£ my claims Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea and in my Certificate of Probable Cause wherein I showed 1 
ml 111 H Kill fi«» I"' € * I "1 - , «f f 
reslst the prosecutions' giving any such evidence o t ~ ,<i^ e? 
I never 1 aid eyes on him that July 12, isas day 
I! 1* w o i f s I (*<• i,'11 I 1 Ihi I »,i. c h a m b e r s . 
2) Has the Court of Appeals departed from your 
decisions and £ rom due process requiring U\e» » he -uM^ r^i *inq ' 
a defendant must be based on accurate information by Its 
ignoring the sentencing transcript which shows me again and 
a q a l n r o m p I a t n I n q th in i t t h«F p r e r - i e n f i-an ;:t=* r e p n r l w a s I i l l •..» I l i e s 
needing rebut, ta 1, • 
3) la It, not a radical departure for the Court, of 
Appeal a \ < • 1, I *• l„ hat I M 1 
victim, non-violent perpetrato , ^ * *«- contents of 
the presentence report when resulted in Judge Cornaby *s 
: wit h deep-seated 
sexual problems mnd with the intent to 1 iave some kind of sexual 
3 
relationship1* with other children and who thereupon sentenced me 
t « i i 1 I e i | ' n I «df"i:«'ij I11 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
On N o v e m b e r 16 }rn\U I f hai It> I il< J i n u t for-
publication, opinion i n this caae #890271 -CA rejecting all claims 
that my pi eaa were unknowing and involuntary. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The date of entry of Court of Appeals opinion 1 s 
November 16, 1989. My Motion for Extension c 
of Certiorari to the Supreme Court was prior to December 18th 
and was mailed to the Supreme Court. Geoffrey . Butler .-" I erk 
of the Supreme Court,, to J d my • i f e, Set.] 1 y , a ' er • a t 
Associate Chief Justice Howe had granted the Motion for 
Extension in accordance with rule 45e; however, I do net yet 
have a copy of the UHIMI , iu I iln mil IN w I I i dn\\H. 
This petit ion for Writ of Certiorari J .a based on 
) i ,i r I s d i c 1 1 <' r in i"" i: i if"i f e i: i e cl b y I: :1 I: I • i \ '" 1 R it 1 e • 12 o I: t h e R u 1 e a o £ th e 
Utah Supreme Court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner pleaded guilty on July 12, 1988 to 
attempted* aggravated (by her being a part-time servant) sexual 
abuse of a child and to dealing in material (letting her see 
Plavbov) harmful to a child. I was sentenced to concurrent 
terms of five to life and zero to five respectively, and fined 
more than $5,000.00. 
After my Motion to Withdraw my Guilty Plea and my 
Supreme Court application for a Certificate of Probable Cause 
were denied, I appealed. 
The case was assigned to the Court of Appeals which 
affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow my plea to be 
withdrawn because they said I should have known that "no 
evidence" would be presented meant that it really would be; that 
two words in the Minute Entry proved I was in chambers to 
approve submission of damaging evidence; that I never asked to 
rebut the presentence report and that its contents did not hurt 
me. 
«to not be faced with "minimum mandatory" 
diligence would preclude an appeal based on ineffectiveness of 
counsel. 
b) The first Namba plea bargain affidavit Steve 
Vanderlinden asked me to sign contained many serious charges 
which he had said would not be included, and which I refused to 
sign# To have recommended I plead guilty to virtually all the 
original charges means either he wanted me to receive a maximum 
sentence, or that it was not worth his time to read the document 
his secretary had prepared for my signature. 
I submit it would be hard to find a more flagrant 
example of lack of effective counsel than is represented by a 
copy of that affidavit I rejected which I possess and will offer 
to the Court. 
c) Before the corrected plea bargain affidavit 
of June 21st was endorsed by the Court, Steve Vanderlinden had 
told my wife, Sally, that Judge Cornaby would not be shown the 
search warrant evidence held by the Kaysville Police Department. 
This was an erroneous statement by him, 
d) Sometime in July?, Vanderlinden phoned me 
very worried to have me meet him in Court the next day to help 
him oppose the prosecutor fs motion? or suggestion? or whatever 
(he never told me which) to have the search warrant evidence 
presented to the judge. He stated he felt they had no right to 
present such damaging evidence after accepting my guilty plea 
to reduced charges, I came to Court with a prepared statement 
I wanted to read into the record. 
-5-
e) While waiting in the court room to help 
Vanderlinden oppose the motion, I observed him, prosecutor Brian 
Namba, and Adult Probation and Parole Officer Judy Valeika in a 
ten-minute meeting just outside the court room on the second 
floor• 
As soon as they adjourned, Vanderlinden came over to 
me to say there had been a meeting in chambers and that the 
problem was resolved, and for me to leave the court house. At 
that point I believed he meant resolved in our favor, not theirs 
I know now he meant theirs since all evidence was presented to 
Judge Cornaby by Judy Valeika shortly thereafter. 
That meeting with the prosecutor, judge and evidence 
gatherer without my knowledge as to subject matter, or consent 
to the agreement reached resulted in the judge receiving 
evidence so incriminating that he sentenced me up to life 
imprisonment (at the whim of the Board of Pardons). 
Such a meeting is tantamount to a conspiracy to 
deprive me of my Constitutional rights and makes my present 
restraint illegal. 
_
-g^_— f) I phoned Vanderlinden the evening before my 
first interview with the Adult Probation and Parole Department's 
Judy Valeika to ask him if there was anything I should be made 
aware of. 
His answer was to "Tell her the whole truth". 
-6-
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1) On Friday, July 15, 1988, I learned from AP&P 
investigator, Judy Valeika, that late that day she had given 
Judge Cornaby the biggest presentence report ever compiled in 
Davis County <R.48) which contained the reasons for life 
imprisonment but which I had a right to examine. I thereupon 
prepared a Notice of Appeal (R.34) to present at the Tuesday, 
July 19th sentencing. It stated how I had been misled at Plea 
Bargain <T1 page 10 lines 18 and 19) by the courts' statement 
that no evidence or testimony would be presented to Judge 
Cornaby. See also Memorandum in Support of Probable Cause <R.71 
pages 5 and 6 and Addendum #3 2/7/89). 
One half hour before sentencing was scheduled, my 
lawyer handed me the huge report. From this cursory review I 
saw it was full of outright lies, rumors and innuendoa. I then 
hand wrote on my typed notice, "lies heavily solicited by Judy 
Valeika** and presented it to the Court during sentencing. 
I never had seen or even heard about the two 
prosecution documents called "Notice of Intent to Present 
Evidence and to Use Hearsay Testimony" <R.4S) till eight monthls 
later when Supreme Court Clerk, Geoff Butler, sent the 
presentence report to me in prison. 
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a) On July 12, 1988, one week prior to 
sentencing, I waa aummoned to Farmington courthouae by my lawyer 
to help him oppoae the prosecutor's preaentation of "Playboy" 
and other aearch warrant evidence to the judge in hia chambers. 
These documents are contained as appendixes in Brief of 
Appellant and Brief of Respondent. Namba dated them July 6, 
1988. After a half hour wait during which I aaw Namba, my 
lawyer and Judy Valeika confer in the aecond floor lobby, 
Venderlinden told me to go back to work that, "All had been 
taken care of". Thia acenario waa aet forth in the following 
court documenta: on page 5 and 6 of my 9/8/88 Memorandum in 
Support of Habeaa Corpua and 12/31/88 Memorandum in Support of 
Probable Cause (R.71 item a page 16). 
Aa a reault, highly inflammatory, damaging 
information was presented to the judge that I never saw till I 
waa aeven montha in priaon, but which formed a major baaia for 
hia giving me life impriaonment in lieu of probation. 
b) On July 12, 1988, becauae of the facts aet 
forth in item a) above, the Diatrict Court cauaed a Minute Entry 
be placed in the file, (see addendum in Appellant'a Brief) that 
aaid I waa present during Namba'a presentation. The Appeala 
Court cited thia entry aa proof I saw and approved the documenta 
and thereby gave up my right to confront and rebut their 
contents in open court. 
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2) During the July 19, 1988 sentencing hearing (T2) I 
challenged again and again the accuracy of the preaentence 
report and claimed I ahould have a right to rebut it. On page 3 
linea 18 thru 22 my lawyer aaid I wanted to challenge the 
atatement of the neighborhood collateral contacta. On page 3 
llnea 10 thru 16 I waa ahown to want to challenge harmful 
innuendoa about taking neighborhood boya akiing. On page 3 
linea 18 and 19 I waa ahown to believe alleged statements of 
parenta were not true. On page 4 llnea 13 and 14 I waa ahown to 
llnea 9 thru 11 I aald the collateral contact recapa contained 
aolicited innuendoa rather than genuine opinions. On page 11 
llnea 20 thru 25 and following. I aaid the interview reporta had 
been deliberately twiated to suggest wrongdoing. On page 12 
llnea 5 thru 11 I state the innuendoa lead to the exact opposite 
of the truth and need to be subjected to rebuttal. 
All these complainta were based on reviewing less 
than 1/5 of the report. When finally sent me by Supreme Court 
Clerk, Geoff Butler, I spent 2 daya analyzing the whole report 
and writing ten <10) pages of rebuttal I hoped to get into the 
record at some stage. 
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Of all the neighborhood collateral contacts, not 
one said they knew of a single instance of even a suggestion of 
specific sexual misconduct. This bottom line conclusion was, 
for reasons best known to Judy Valeika, never articulated or 
even hinted at. She overwhelmed this basic conclusion with 
thirty <30) pages of rumors and innuendos about my power to 
manipulate children, neighborhood fears, and that I had intent 
to commit other sexual crimes. 
After all these neighborhood and my 
daughters'interviews failed to show any kind of sexual 
misconduct, Ms. Valeika, during the week of July 10th, informed 
me that the AP&P needed some serious instance of past sexual 
misconduct or else I could not be recommended for treatment on 
the outside, but would have to be incarcerated for willful 
inexcusable sexual misconduct. I invented a story <T2 lines 11 
thru 16). 
This is the background of her report on me on page 
14 next to last paragraph <R.48) that caused Judge Cornaby's 
rebuttal to my claim of a clean past that I had indeed molested 
a girl 39 years ago <T2 page 6 line 24 thru page 7 line 20). 
3) The unrebutted misinformation of the presentence 
report plus the secret inflammatory information presented by the 
prosecutor to the judge resulted in great harm to me at 
9 
sentencing as can be judged by the following remarks of Judge 
Cornaby's contained in the sentencing transcript <T2): page 3 
line 23 thru page 4 line 11 he says I would be able to change 
witnesses' true stories into untrue ones if he allowed me to 
examine them. He accuses me of writing my wife's letter to him 
and gets called a liar by the one who was with her when she 
wrote it. (See also T3 page 9 lines 19 thru 25). 
Page 9 lines 2 thru line 9 page 10 he concludes my 
hitting Justice White (who was not injured) was a prior act of 
violence rather than one of civil disobedience. 
Page 13 lines 7 thru 11 he uses the unrebutted 
presentence report to overrule Dr. Roby's ISAT 8-page 
psychological exam report (R.4S) that testing •• 
did not indicate that he suffers from 
the same degree of psychopathology which 
the vast majority of those assessed for 
similar offenses do.•.Cand3 fails to 
suggest any underlying major affective 
or characterological disorders to which 
Newt's sexually illicit behavior may be 
attributed.••Cand] Newt appears a much 
less pathological picture than most 
offenders this examiner has evaluated... 
[and it would be this examiner's 
recommendation that Newt not be 
incarcerated at either Utah State Prison 
or Utah State Hospital since he does not 
appear to need the intensity of 
treatment or supervision such facilities 
provide...Cand3 this examiner feels, in 
this case, it might be best to require 
Newt Estes to successfully complete an 
outpatient program. . . •• 
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Page 14 line 20 thru line 7 page 15 Cornaby 
inatead aaya I am a high risk offender who tries to replace 
parental relationahipa because I have an intent to have aex with 
them and that I have long had deep-seated sexual problems. 
Page 15 linea 15 thru 18 aaya I hit Justice White 
because that Court would not protect me from my own weaknesses -
whereaa I acted on the fact that it waa tyranny to deprive local 
governments of their right (should they desire to do so) to 
promote the general welfare as had always been done in the past 
by most non-seaport communities. 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
1) It was a violation of constitutional rights to due 
process to be told at guilty plea that the State would not 
present any evidence or testimony because it thereupon went 
ahead and presented all this evidence and other material which 
would not have been admissable at trial. 
To have used all this evidence to determine the 
defendant's punishment while preventing him from even learning 
of the contenta ao he could rebut them is an unspeakable assault 
on due process. 
11 
The district judge ahould have aaid at plea 
bargain that there would be no formal evidence or aworn 
teatimony but thia aame information could be received by the 
aentencing Court to help it determine degree of guilt. 
a & b) If an Appeala Court ia allowed to rule 
that a defendant haa given up hia 77-18-1<4) atatutory right to 
hear and challenge damaging aentencing information on the baaia 
of 2 worda in a Minute Entry, it in eaaence ia given licenae to 
nullify the fair application of the law. I aubmlt a defendant 
can only be assumed to have waived thia right by hia aignature 
on the documenta in queation that he underatanda their contenta 
and needa not have them recited at aentencing. 
2) The Appeala Court haa approved removal of the 
aafeguarda that aentencing ahould be baaed upon information 
which haa had GLII opportunity to have been teated for reaaonable 
accuracy. It haa endoraed a procedure whereby the diatrict 
court not only makes no effort to inquire if the aentencing 
report haa been examined for groaa errors, but inatead rejects 
and ridiculea apontaneoua complainta about how all the liea need 
anawerlng. 
12 
To have aentencing baaed on accurate information, 
aa due proceaa would aeem to require, means the judge must 
aacertain if both aidea agree aa to the accuracy of ita contenta 
by asking thoae kinda of queationa. 
3) When an Appeala Court rulea that the appellant haa 
shown no injury stemming from a presentence report be challenged 
in Court aa being "full of Ilea" merely because hia lawyer 
refused his request to file an answer to respondent's brief, it 
haa made a deliberate attempt to avoid conaidering the obvioua 
truth, namely that injury and prejudice ahould be aasumed when 
the tranacript ahowa many complaints after which a first-time, 
non-violent, aingle event, aingle victim 63-year-old defendant 
ia aentenced to a career-ending life imprisonment in lieu of 
being given probation. 
Theae aame unanawered lies will alao be uaed to 
deny parole again and again. 
When auch reaults can come from a traitoroua 
lawyer's failure to answer a response, the Appeals Court has no 
right to assume the oppoaite from the obvious. 
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CONCLUSION 
Trial courts should be required to have a defendant 
understand the sentencing process, and then to ascertain if he 
knows the contents of the documents involved. A judge would 
then be less inclined to overrule the State Psychiatrist and 
imprison a man for life for a supposed intent to commit further 
crimes• 
If I had been so informed, a lack of intent would 
easily have been shown as the only explanation why Valeikafs 
search could not turn up one other victim. Only this lack can 
explain why the uncanny ability to dominate and the inordinate 
opportunity to do so, for which I was condemned, resulted in not 
one other occurrence. 
Dated this ZJcJdaj of J anuary, 1990. 
NEWTON COLLIER ESTES 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3k^J;day of January, 1990, 
I hand delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney 
General of the State of Utah, 236 Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84114. 
Sa l j ly E§/fces, 
Wife of Defendant-Appellant 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Newton Collier Estes, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
NOW 61989 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890271-CA 
Second District, Davis County 
Honorable Douglas Cornaby 
Attorneys: Jay D. Edmonds, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Croft.1 
CROFT, Judge: 
This appeal is from the trial court's denial of appellant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to a two-count information* 
We affirm. 
Appellant pleaded guilty to a first-degree felony of 
attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child and to a 
third-degree felony of dealing in material harmful to a child. 
After reviewing a presentence report prepared by the Department 
of Corrections, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms 
of five years to life and zero to five years on the two charges. 
A few months later, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
but his motion was denied and he appeals from that denial. 
1. Bryant H. Croft, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 
1989). 
Appellant contends the denial of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas was an abuse of the trial courtfs discretion. He 
asserts his motion should have been granted because of the 
court's failure to (1) to advise him that by pleading guilty he 
was waiving his right to confront and to cross-examine, the 
witnesses against him, and (2) afford him an opportunity to 
present information to rebut the presentence report and to 
require the prosecuting attorney to submit the information and 
evidence in open court, on the record, and in appellant's 
presence at the time of sentencing as required by law. 
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be 
reversed only when it clearly appears the trial court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah 1987); State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-ll(e) (Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)) 
provides, among other things, that the court shall not accept a 
guilty plea until the court has made findings "that the 
defendant knows he has rights against compulsory 
self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the witnesses against him, and that 
by entering the plea he waives all of those rights." 
Appellant alleges there is nothing in the record to show 
that when he entered his guilty pleas, he was informed of his 
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, nor is there any reference thereto in the 
affidavit he signed with respect to such pleas. 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), our 
supreme court said: "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 
11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered." 
In Vasilacopulos.- this court said trial courts may not rely 
on defense counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy the 
specific requirements of Rule 11(e), and that, "[r]ather, with 
or without an affidavit or defense counsel's advice, the trial 
court must conduct an on-the-record review with the defendant 
of the Rule 11(e) requirements. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d at 94• 
The use of an affidavit in the guilty plea processes is not 
required under our law. Thus, if used, what it does or does 
not contain is not controlling. The appellate court must 
890271-CA 2 
review the record of the plea proceedings to determine if the 
trial court met those requirements. 
The record discloses appellant entered his guilty pleas on 
June 21, 1988, in open court with his counsel present, during 
which the court advised appellant he would be waiving a trial 
either by the court or before a jury by pleading guilty, to 
which appellant responded that he so understood. The court 
then advised appellant that he had a right to require the state 
to call witnesses and by those witnesses to prove each element 
of the offense charged against him in each of the two separate 
counts, to which the appellant again responded that he so 
understood. The court went on to say that the state would not 
call any witnesses nor produce any evidence before the court if 
"you plead guilty. Do you understand that?" Again, an 
affirmative reply was given. 
The requirements of Rule 11(e) may be shown to have been 
met by what the trial court said to a defendant. The use of 
the exact wording of the rule is not mandated by our law or 
controlling appellate court decisions. We find that telling 
the appellant he had the right to require the state to call 
witnesses and by those witnesses prove each element of the 
charges against him effectively disclosed to him his rights to 
confront and to cross-examine the witnesses who would have been 
called had appellant elected to be tried. We therefore 
conclude that the trial court complied sufficiently with Rule 
11(e). 
At the time appellant entered his guilty pleas and their 
acceptance by the court, the trial judge stated he would prefer 
a presentence report, to which appellant agreed. Appellant was 
then advised by the court that he was to go to the Department 
of Corrections, and that he should immediately make an 
appointment "to provide them with information." Appellant did 
so, and an extensive presentence report was prepared by the 
Department of Corrections and submitted to the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) (1989) provides: 
(a) Prior to the imposition of any 
sentence the court may, with the concurrence 
of the defendant, continue the date for the 
imposition of sentence . . . for the purpose 
of obtaining a presentence investigation 
report from the Department of Corrections or 
information from other sources about the 
defendant 
890271-CA 3 
(b) At the time of sentence, the court 
shall hear any testimony or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney 
desires to present concerning the 
appropriate sentence. This testimony or 
information shall be presented in open court 
on record and in the presence of defendant* 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-22(a) (1982) states: 
Before imposing sentence the court 
shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement in his own behalf and to 
present any information in mitigation of 
punishment/ or to show any legal cause why 
sentence should not be imposed. The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information 
material to the imposition of sentence. 
The presentence report reflects that appellant and members 
of his family were extensively interviewed. Appellant 
furnished over thirty letters and documents to the probation 
agent for inclusion in the report and submission to the court. 
The report contained information obtained by the probation 
agent from various persons, some favorable, some unfavorable. 
An extensive psychological evaluation was made, and concluded 
with the psychiatrist pointedly recommending that appellant not 
be incarcerated. 
The record reflects that on the day of sentencing, July 19, 
1988, appellant and his counsel received a copy of the 
presentence report and spent an hour reviewing it. It was made 
a part of the court record. 
Prior to sentencing, the prosecuting attorney submitted to 
the court and appellant two written documents dated July 5, 
1988, one entitled "Sentence Recommendation," in which it was 
stated the prosecutor would recommend consecutive prison 
sentences and set forth his reasons for doing so. The second 
was entitled "Notice of Intent to Present Evidence and to Use 
Hearsay Evidence" in which the prosecutor stated he intended to 
call as witnesses at the sentencing hearing the mother of the 
victim and the investigating police officer. A summary of the 
expected testimony of each was provided, with reference to 
several pornographic photos and a tape of an interview with 
appellant. 
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A minute entry dated July 12/ 1988, discloses that on that 
date appellant and counsel appeared before the court; that the 
prosecutor and defense counsel met in chambers with the court; 
that the prosecutor's Sentence Recommendation and Notice of 
Intent to Present Evidence had been filed; that the prosecutor 
there agreed that said documents would not be placed in the 
court's official file but would be left with the court for 
consideration at the time of sentencing; that copies would be 
given to the Department of Corrections/ and contained the 
statement/ "The court grants the motion." It is apparent from 
the minute entry that this agreement was initiated by appellant 
and his counsel. 
At the sentencing hearing, the two witnesses did not 
testify/ and nothing further was said about those two 
documents. Appellant contends the fact that they were included 
in the presentence report resulted in the prosecutor getting 
the information included therein to the court contrary to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) (1989). The court already had them for 
consideration pursuant to the understanding reached at the July 
12 hearing. 
Appellant contends that statute requires that any 
sentencing materials be presented orally/ "presumably" either 
by testimony or by the prosecutor's oral statement on the 
record. A presentence report is statutorily a part of the 
sentencing procedures and the suggestion that its contents must 
be presented in open court either orally by the prosecution or 
through witnesses called to testify concerning its contents is 
without 
merit. 
Appellant cites cases requiring the materials in a 
presentence report to be disclosed to a defendant. Such was 
done in this case. Appellant contends that implicit in such 
rulings is the principle that a defendant must have a chance to 
rebut matters contained in the report. There is nothing in the 
record to show appellant could have done so. 
Appellantfs statutory right was to make a statement on his 
own behalf and to present information in mitigation of 
punishment. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-22(a) (1982). At the time 
of sentence, the court "shall hear any testimony or information 
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) (1989). 
Appellant met with the probation officer/ furnished extensive 
information about himself and details concerning the crimes 
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committed, and submitted numerous letters from family, 
employers/ neighbors, and friends favorable to himself, all of 
which was included in the report. The record discloses 
appellant made his statement to the court but had no other 
testimony to present. 
Appellant was disturbed by what he read in the presentence 
report of unfavorable comments made by some neighbors, and 
stated to the court he did not believe those neighbors truly 
felt that way about him. He contends their comments were being 
used against him without his having any chance to rebut them. 
His counsel stated appellant "feels that if he could talk to 
them they wouldnft be that way." 
Appellant interprets this comment of counsel as a request 
to the court for additional time to allow appellant to talk to 
such persons. The court's response to the comment was that 
appellant was a "very domineering individual" and that "he 
wants to sit down and talk with them because he wants to 
persuade them to be the way he wants them to be." Appellant's 
brief suggests nothing to indicate such endeavor would have 
been successful. Neither appellant nor his counsel made any 
specific request for continuance of the sentencing hearing. 
Appellant in his brief recites the courtfs comment at the 
time he entered his guilty pleas to the effect that "The state 
will not call any witnesses nor will they produce any evidence 
before the court if you plead guilty." It is argued that 
appellant took this literally and as an assurance that, by 
pleading guilty, he could thereby prevent the sentencing judge 
from hearing or otherwise knowing any of the inflammatory 
evidence relating to his alleged crimes, believing the "State" 
included not only the prosecutor but also the Department of 
Corrections presentence investigators. The quoted statement 
was made as the trial judge was advising appellant concerning 
the effects of waiving a trial by pleading guilty. The court 
already had the "inflammatory evidence" from the information, 
the probable cause statement included therein, appellant's own 
affidavit executed and filed with the court when his guilty 
pleas were entered, and the court was certain to receive the 
presentence report authorized by statute. 
Thus, we find nothing in the sentencing process that 
constituted a denial of appellant's constitutional or statutory 
rights. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
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discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas. The judgment is affirmed. 
H. Crort, Judge n 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT 
SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, I.E., IS A PLEA 
VOLUNTARY IN LIGHT OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S BELIEF THAT 
SUCH A PLEA WOULD PROTECT THE DETAILS OF HIS ALLEGED 
CRIMES FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY AFTER THE COURT PROMISED THAT 
THE STATE WOULD PRESENT NO EVIDENCE; WHAT MUST THE 
COURT ACTUALLY DO TO INFORM A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT OF HIS 
RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE A WITNESS; WHAT CONSTITUTES A 
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT TO 
PRESENT INFORMATION REBUTTING AN INCORRECT PRESENTENCE 
REPORT; IS THE STATE REQUIRED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
INTENDED FOR USE AT SENTENCING IN OPEN COURT, ON THE 
RECORD, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT. 
iv 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court 
below (C.A. NUMBER 890271-CA, November 16, 1989) pursuant to Rule 42, 
Rules Of The Utah Supreme Court. 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Newton C. Estes pleaded guilty to a first degree felony of attempted 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child and to a third degree felony of dealing in 
material harmful to a child. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Estes 
to concurrent terms of five years to life and zero to five years respectively. 
Estes subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas but his motion was 
denied and he appealed. 
The case was assigned to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial 
court's decision. 
Estes now seeks Supreme Court review of the Court of Appeals1 decision. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
I. A PLEA IS NOT VOLUNTARY IN LIGHT OF A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT'S BELIEF THAT SUCH A PLEA WOULD PROTECT THE 
DETAILS OF HIS ALLEGED CRIMES FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY AFTER 
THE COURT PROMISED THAT THE STATE WOULD PRESENT NO 
EVIDENCE. 
A guilty plea must be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. State 
v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). Estes makes the argument that 
his guilty plea was not intelligently made due to his mistaken reliance on the 
literal meaning of the trial court's statement that "no" evidence would be 
presented if a guilty plea was entered. Evidence was however presented -at— 
seateaeing: i^^^A w \A^k ^^(WJMAU^C yiA, 
While The Utah Supreme Court has addressed issues surrounding a plea of 
guilty, Estes avers this is a unique twist to such an issue. How literally can the 
average criminal defendant interpret the judge's comments during the plea 
hearing? Since Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and its progeny, 
were no doubt designed to protect defendants from unknowingly or 
unintelligently entering guilty pleas, further study of this issue is warranted. See 
also; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
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II. THE SENTENCING COURT MUST ACTUALLY INFORM CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS OF THEIR RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES. 
A review of the record below indicates that the court never specifically 
informed Estes of his right to "confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him." The Court of Appeals ruled that a cursory explanation, 
outside the information used in the plea affidavit, was sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 11(e). It should be noted that this decision seems to be in 
conflict with this Court's decision in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987). 
In Gibbons, the Court found that such affidavits " . . . should list 
individually and specifically the rights waived by the entry of the guilty plea." 
Id. at 1313. 
III. ESTES DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO 
PRESENT INFORMATION REBUTTING AN INCORRECT PRESENTENCE 
REPORT. 
The record shows that Estes and counsel received the pre-sentence report 
the day of sentencing. Exercising his rights pursuant to §77-35-22(a), U.C.A., 
Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and §77-18-1(4), U.C.A., Estes, 
through his lawyer, requested additional time to interview persons allegedly 
spoken to by the presentence investigator. The request was denied by way of a 
speech uttered from the bench. The fact that the request was made satisfies the 
2 
need under Utah law to object to an inaccurate presentence report. See: State v. 
Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980). 
More importantly, it is well settled in Utah and by the federal courts that 
criminal defendants are entitled to receive accurate presentence reports. See: 
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985) and State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 
1246 (Utah 1980). See also: Dorsyznski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 
(1974) and Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980). Estes received neither 
sufficient time to review the presentence report, or an accurate presentence 
report. 
IV. THE STATE IS REQUIRED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE INTENDED 
FOR USE AT SENTENCING IN OPEN COURT, ON THE RECORD, AND IN 
THE PRESENCE OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT. 
Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and §77-18-1(4), 
U. C.A. govern the submission by the prosecution of testimony, evidence or other 
information concerning the imposition of the appropriate sentence. 
The statute specifically requires: 
"This testimony or information shall be presented in 
open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant." §77-18-1(4), U.C.A. 
As noted below, the prosecution prepared two documents which were 
never actually legally "filed." They were somehow made an unofficial part of the 
record pursuant to a minute entry according to the Court of Appeals. (See 
Appendix "A", pp. 4-5) 
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Regardless of the method used by the trial court to gain access to the 
prosecutor's sentencing wishes, or the method used by the Court of Appeals to 
justify the use of these documents, the fact still remains that a court rule, 
presumably prescribed by the Supreme Court, was ignored. Documents 
containing evidence and information relevant to the sentencing were not 
presented in open court and made an official part of the record, in the presence 
of the Defendant, as required by both statute and rule. The Court of Appeals 
decision with regard to this obvious anomaly is in direct conflict with all 
established statutory precedents. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
Certiorari should be granted because the Court of Appeals decided issues 
which are actually questions of first impression, or in conflict with other Utah 
Supreme Court decisions or approved rules and as such, are issues more suited to 
resolution in the Supreme Court. 
This case provides the Court with the proper vehicle for determining the 
rights and responsibilities of criminal defendants and prosecutors in such cases. 
Due to the Petitioner's age, he faces what amounts to natural life in prison 
and consequently, this case is serious enough to warrant further review. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Newton C. Estes, Pro se 
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